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ABSTRACT. Divestitures of property, plant and equipment (PPE) assets are a common form 
of corporate restructuring. However, divesting companies do not necessarily attain improved 
post-divestiture shareholder wealth. Studies show company characteristics and use of dives-
titure proceeds may influence divestiture outcomes. This paper attempts to determine these 
divesting company characteristics and use of proceeds associated with improved shareholder 
wealth based on the Agency Theory. A sample of Malaysian public-listed companies that 
divested assets within 2002–2005 is used. Logistic regression segregates these companies 
based on their industry-adjusted operational returns. Companies that improve post-divestiture 
operational performance require urgent pay out motives to divest. Companies with deterio-
rated post-divestiture performance divest without urgent pay out motive and tend to retain 
proceeds. This suggests agency problem of managerial discretion in asset divestitures. In 
asset selection, divestitures of larger and more inefficient assets were found associated with 
improved company performance. Malaysian companies prefer divesting assets related to their 
core businesses indicating a diversified company structure is more beneficial than a focused 
structure in developing countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Companies restructure to counter anticipated 
and ex-post changes in their environment. This 
paper focuses on property, plant and equip-
ment (collectively termed as ‘asset’) divesti-
tures, as the most common asset reduction 
method (Denis and Shome, 2005). Divestitures 
of such tangible corporate assets are viewed 
as efficient transfers of corporate resources 
(Weston et al., 2003) to enhance shareholder 
wealth. In fact, Moschieri and Mair (2011) ex-
plained that divestitures are valuable strategic 
decisions that could lead to enhanced profit-
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ability and corporate reputation as well as im-
proved market performance. 
In general however, divestitures tend to re-
ceive minimal academic attention as compared 
to mergers even though both events involve 
transfers of ownership and control of corporate 
assets (Gadad et al., 2009). Most published re-
searches on divestitures attempted to deter-
mine whether divesting companies perform 
better than their non-divesting counterparts. 
This is usually conducted using matched con-
trol samples of non-divesting companies from 
the same industries (see Schlingemann et al., 
2002; Sun, 2012). Many studies found positive 
association between divestitures and company 
performance (see e.g. Jain, 1985; Hanousek et 
al., 2009; Owen et al., 2010; Sun, 2012) while 
others determined insignificant association 
(Alexander et al., 1984). A third group found 
that differing company characteristics, e.g. 
level of distress (Lasfer et al., 1996) and use 
of divestiture proceeds (Bates, 2005) are sig-
nificant variables influencing post-divestiture 
performance.
The issue that arises from these studies is 
not all divesting companies attain better post-
divestiture performance. Since divestitures are 
commonly executed by companies attempting 
to enhance shareholder wealth, it is important 
to determine the association between divesti-
tures and post-divestiture performance. In 
fact, Hearth and Zaima (1986) have expressed 
there is no theory that a priori separates dives-
titures with positive or negative performance 
outcomes and till to date, no studies have done 
so. This study attempts to address this issue 
by determining company attributes as well as 
use of divestiture proceeds and their associa-
tion with subsequent improvement (termed as 
‘success’) or deterioration (denoted as ‘failure’) 
divesting companies. 
A sample of divesting Malaysian public-
listed companies is used. We chose a devel-
oping country since few empirical studies ex-
amined divestitures in such an institutional 
context (Sun, 2012). Furthermore, Hanousek 
et al. (2009) explained that divestitures are 
important phenomena in such countries and 
researches were mainly hampered by inad-
equate data. The underlying theory used to 
develop our hypotheses is the agency theory. 
This is because according to Markides and Sin-
gh (1997), agency theory is the most prominent 
explanation for corporate restructuring in aca-
demic literature. 
The implications of this study may be use-
ful to shareholders of public-listed companies 
to determine how companies’ characteristics 
and use of divestiture proceeds can affect their 
future wealth. The results may also help regu-
latory authorities understand how divestitures 
could enhance company performance or other-
wise to improve future regulatory and moni-
toring purposes. Section 2 discusses the un-
derpinning literature and hypotheses, section 
3 describes the data and methodology. Section 
4 explains the results and section 5 concludes 
this study. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Based on the wealth-maximizing hypothesis, 
managers should divest assets when company 
performance can be improved thus leading to 
shareholder wealth enhancement. On the con-
trary, Markides and Singh (1997) found the 
most prominent explanation among past stud-
ies regarding corporate restructuring is the 
agency theory. 
2.1. Agency theory and asset divestitures
An agency relationship occurs when a princi-
pal (shareholder) delegates some authority to 
his agent (manager) to perform services on the 
former’s behalf (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
However, agency problems arise when compa-
ny managers attempt to maximize their own 
personal utility at shareholders’ expense. As a 
result, company performance deteriorated and 
consequently, restructuring incidences such as 
asset divestitures are attempts to correct these 
agency problems. 
Managerial actions symptomatic of agency 
problems include growth maximization and ex-
cessive diversification into various businesses. 
Company growth is positively related to in-
creases in managerial compensation (Jensen, 
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1986) as well as bonuses, stock options and 
promotions. Prestige and power enjoyed by 
managers are highly correlated to their com-
pany’s size and growth as well. For these rea-
sons, managers prefer overseeing larger com-
panies and will embark to maximize company 
size. 
Managers’ income from employment consti-
tutes a major portion of their total income and 
as such, they have very high undiversifiable 
employment risk (Amihud and Lev, 1981). One 
of the ways to minimize employment risk is 
to stabilize the company’s income stream as 
imperfectly correlated earnings stream would 
reduce variation in the company’s overall in-
come. This can be carried out by diversifying 
the company’s line of businesses into different 
industries. 
The agency theory suggests that managers 
tend to be ‘self-serving’ at shareholders’ ex-
pense. As such, Lang et al. (1995) argue that 
managers will be reluctant to divest assets. 
Denis and Shome (2005) concurred that since 
managers’ private benefits increases with 
company size, they will hesitate to reduce the 
scope of assets under their control.
In Malaysia, the agency relationship in 
public-listed companies is not between diffused 
shareholders and managers as depicted by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). This is because 
there is high concentrated share ownership 
(La Porta et al., 1998), where 40% of listed 
companies are family-controlled (Deesomsak 
et al., 2004), often supplying the top manager 
(Faccio et al., 2001). As a result, the common 
agency relationship in Malaysian public-listed 
companies is between these concentrated own-
er-manager and minority shareholders. The 
agency problem that arises is the potential 
expropriation of minority shareholders, for ex-
ample, controlling shareholders enrich them-
selves by not paying dividends (Claessens et 
al., 1999). This is dubbed as ‘crony capitalism’ 
(Lins and Servaes, 2002) where Alias et al. 
(2010) supported that concentrated ownership 
in Malaysian companies is not associated with 
improved post-restructuring performance. 
The research hypotheses relating asset di-
vestitures with company performance are de-
veloped below based on agency theory and the 
Malaysian institutional and corporate context.
2.2. Alleviation of financial constraint as 
motivation for asset divestitures
Greater information asymmetry exists be-
tween managers and investors in emerging 
markets, plausibly due to lack of reliable fi-
nancial reporting and limited analyst follow-
ing (Lins and Servaes, 2002). Due to poorer 
access to external funds, the costs of external 
financing may be more expensive (Beck et al., 
2002). Consequently, internal funds become 
more valuable and the proceeds derived from 
asset divestitures are one such source. Fur-
thermore, there are fewer deterrents to raise 
funds through asset divestitures as compared 
to raising new equity or debt because the buy-
ers are usually well-informed parties from the 
same industry. 
Malaysian companies have low debt lev-
els, in particular, a lower proportion of long-
term debt (Booth et al., 2001). This may be 
attributed to the discrepancy between the 
cost of external and internal funds. In addi-
tion, the average short-term debt ratio is ap-
proximately twice that of long-term debt ratio 
(Pandey, 2001). Therefore, despite lower gear-
ing levels, there is a tendency towards finan-
cial constraint when cashflow is insufficient to 
repay current debt due. The insolvency risks 
associated with financial constraint threatens 
the manager’s employment and main source 
of income. As a result, managers’ interests be-
come aligned with the shareholders’ and they 
divest assets in order to alleviate financial con-
straint. Lang et al. (1995) explained that the 
most compelling motive for divestiture is the 
urgent need to obtain internal funds because 
external financing is too costly. 
Without any urgent motives to divest, Bates 
(2005) explained that self-serving managers 
divest assets to realize substantial increased 
liquidity at their disposal. Managers may in-
vest in relatively safe projects with suboptimal 
yield to preserve their personal interest (Eas-
terbrook, 1984) due to their undiversifiable 
employment risks (Amihud and Lev, 1981). 
In addition, capital market monitoring can be 
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avoided since asset divestitures are mainly 
private transactions (Slovin et al., 1995). 
We posit companies that divest to alleviate 
financial constraint will have lower agency 
problems, leading to improved post-divestiture 
performance as compared to companies with-
out such motive. Hence, the first hypothesis:
H1: Companies that divest to reduce finan-
cial constraint will improve post-divestiture 
performance. 
2.3. Relative size of divested asset and 
company performance
Weston et al. (2003) assert that differential 
relative size of divested assets is the cause of 
inconsistent shareholder wealth effect in em-
pirical literature. Duhaime and Baird (1987) 
found that the relative size of divested asset 
depends on the company’s financial strength. 
Specifically, companies are more attached to 
larger assets, tied by psychological and eco-
nomic bonds. Hence, large assets will only be 
divested under conditions of duress. Bergh 
(1995) concurs that companies divest large as-
sets for defensive reasons and prefer selling 
smaller assets as it does not threaten the com-
pany’s overall revenue stream.
The Securities Commission of Malaysia - 
SC (n.d.) imposes correspondingly greater dis-
closure requirements for public-listed compa-
nies that divest large asset. Firstly, companies 
divesting assets of at least 5% ‘percentage ra-
tio’1 must publicly announce via Bursa Malay-
sia (BM). Companies intending to divest assets 
with a ‘percentage ratio’ of at least 25% will 
require the prior approval of company share-
holders. Divestitures of 100% percentage ratio 
and above need the additional approval of the 
SC, where the subsequent proceeds disburse-
ment will be subjected to monitoring. 
1 Percentage ratio is calculated as (i) latest net book 
value of divested asset against net assets of divesting 
company, where net assets is defined as share capital + 
reserves – minority interests; (ii) sale price of divested 
asset to net assets of divesting company; (iii) sale price 
of divested asset to market capitalization of divesting 
company. The largest calculated percentage ratio will 
be used to represent the relative size of divested asset.
Under these circumstances, we posit that 
the manifestation of agency problems is great-
er for companies with smaller asset divesti-
tures. Given a choice, self-serving managers 
prefer divesting smaller assets (below 25% 
percentage ratio) as it is easier to avoid in-
tense scrutiny. The company’s income stream 
will not be affected, hence their employment 
is preserved. Larger assets would be divested 
under duress, such as to alleviate urgent fi-
nancial constraint. The second hypothesis:
H2: Companies that divest larger relative 
size of assets will improve post-divestiture fi-
nancial performance.
2.4. Use of asset divestiture proceeds 
and company performance
According to the financing hypothesis, com-
panies can use divestiture proceeds to repay 
shareholders via share repurchase and/ or 
dividends, repay creditors by servicing debt 
and retain the proceeds for future investment 
opportunities. Past studies found that use of 
divestiture proceeds is associated with differ-
ing post-divestiture performance. For instance, 
Bowman et al. (1999) determined significantly 
positive wealth impact for payouts and negli-
gible impact for retained proceeds. Hillier et 
al. (2005) found retained proceeds significantly 
associated with negative post-divestiture Re-
turn On Asset (ROA). Other studies found su-
perior performance for debt payout (e.g. Gadad 
and Thomas, 2004; Bates, 2005) as opposed to 
rewarding shareholders or retaining proceeds. 
The overall consensus indicates that reten-
tion of proceeds is negatively associated with 
improved post-divestiture performance. The 
free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986) explains 
it is detrimental to leave excess cash at man-
agers’ discretion due to their propensity to 
invest in suboptimal projects. When proceeds 
are paid out, there is less opportunity for such 
misuse. As potential expropriation of minor-
ity shareholders by controlling shareholders 
is higher in emerging countries, we posit com-
panies that pay out divestiture proceeds will 
experienced improved post-divestiture perfor-
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mance compared to companies that retain di-
vestiture proceeds. Hypothesis 3:
H3: Companies that pay out divestiture pro-
ceeds will improve post-divestiture performance 
as compared to companies that retain divesti-
ture proceeds.
2.5. Asset divestitures to increase 
company efficiency and focus
A manifestation of the agency problem is the 
‘managerial hypothesis’ where managers have 
a propensity to increase the size and diversifi-
cation (reduce focus) of companies under their 
control. According to Jensen (1986), growth is 
positively related to increases in managerial 
compensation and enlarges the resource base 
under their control. Managers may grow the 
company by investing in suboptimal projects 
which are not beneficial to shareholders. Owen 
et al. (2010) expressed that managers have a 
tendency to diversify widely and over-extend 
their reach in non-core areas of businesses. 
This is because diversification of companies’ 
businesses will result in imperfectly corre-
lated earnings that could stabilize volatility 
in the overall income stream. The managers’ 
undiversifiable employment risks can be mini-
mized (Amihud and Lev, 1981). According to 
the agency theory, suboptimal and diversified 
investments are symptomatic of the agency 
problem.
The ‘efficient deployment hypothesis’ theo-
rizes that a divesting company gains when the 
market perceives the asset was profitably di-
vested (Lang et al., 1995). For example, when 
the divested asset is surplus to company’s re-
quirements or had interfered with its business 
operations (John and Ofek, 1995). This should 
result in higher post-divestiture efficiency of 
the remaining assets in the company (Gadad 
and Thomas, 2004). Relating to agency theory, 
divestitures of such inefficient assets may be 
viewed as attempts to remedy past agency 
mistakes of managerial excesses and ineffi-
ciencies (Markides and Singh, 1997). 
We posit that divestiture of inefficient as-
sets, whether surplus or that produce dise-
conomies with the company will improve post-
divestiture performance. Hence, hypothesis 4:
H4: Companies that increase post-dives-
titure efficiency by divesting inefficient assets 
will improve in performance.
Lins and Servaes (2002) explained that 
companies facing difficulties in securing exter-
nal financing compensate by diversifying their 
business to create internal capital markets. As 
mentioned above, this may aggravate potential 
agency problems - which were found positively 
related to diversification. This is because the 
opaque dealings of diversified companies al-
low greater potential expropriation of minor-
ity shareholders (Mitton, 2002) as compared 
to their focused counterparts. Furthermore, 
Francoeur and Niyabahwe (2009) explained 
that the internal capital markets of diversified 
companies are less efficient in allocating capi-
tal, which is associated with lower company 
value. 
As a result of diversification, Lang and 
Stulz (1994) found that diversified companies 
have lower value (Tobin’s q) compared to sin-
gle-industry companies. This value loss or ‘di-
versification discount’ can be mitigated when 
assets in peripheral (non-core) businesses are 
divested (Berger and Ofek, 1995) as compared 
to divesting related assets (John and Ofek, 
1995). According to Hatfield et al. (1996), fo-
cused companies tend to perform better due to 
improved factor specialization and managerial 
efficiency. DePamphilis (2010) summarizes 
that divestitures can create value by increas-
ing the diversified company’s focus, reducing 
diversification discount by transferring the 
assets to others who can use them more effec-
tively and eventually reduces agency conflicts.
Lins and Servaes (2002) found over 47% of 
Malaysian companies were diversified. Their 
entire sample of Asian countries shows a di-
versification discount of 7.7%. In an earlier 
study, Claessens et al. (1998) determined least 
segmental complementarities amongst Malay-
sian companies. The main concern of Lins and 
Servaes (2002) is how diversification could 
compound agency problems in emerging coun-
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tries, supporting DePamphilis (2010) assertion 
that divestitures could reduce such agency 
conflicts. It is easier for controlling sharehold-
ers to manage diversified companies for their 
personal interest. In fact, the authors suggest 
that the potential expropriation of minority 
shareholders is the basis for diversification 
discount in emerging countries. 
A contrasting view on diversification by 
Khanna and Palepu (1997) explained that the 
conglomerate form (highly diversified) com-
pany is particularly suited to the institutional 
context of most emerging countries where ex-
ternal capital markets are less developed. In 
fact, Fauver et al. (2003) found that conglom-
erates tend to perform better, i.e. trade at di-
versification premium, in developing countries. 
Their results on Malaysian companies reveal 
positive, non-significant relationship between 
corporate value and level of diversification.
We posit companies that increase focus 
by divesting non-core assets signify attempts 
to reduce diversification discount and rectify 
agency problems of over-diversification. How-
ever, the positive mitigating effect of diversi-
fication on companies in developing countries 
may render the results insignificant. Hypoth-
esis 5:
H5: Companies that increased focus by di-
vesting non-core assets will improve post-dives-
titure performance.
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The performance impacts of divestitures are 
typically analyzed using very short-term event 
studies. For example, Sun (2012) uses an event 
window of [–150days; +30days] and Owen 
et al. (2010) uses [–1day; +1day]. This study 
however adopts a longitudinal timeframe as 
Bergh (1997) determined persistent impact of 
divestitures beyond the short-term. We chose 
the timeframe of Denis and Shome (2005) and 
Hillier et al. (2005) respectively of 3years pre- 
[–3yr; –1yr] and 3years post-divestiture [+1yr; 
+3yr]. Similar to Gadad et al. (2009), we deter-
mine one pre-divestiture and one post-dives-
titure averaged measure of performance for 
each divesting company. The research model 
is shown in Figure 1.
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3.1. Sample and data sources
The sample consists of asset (PPE) divesti-
tures of public-listed companies in Malaysia. 
Details of divesting company announcements 
are obtained from BM website and the an-
nouncement dates will be as stated. The cor-
responding historical financial data for each 
divesting company is sourced from Datastream 
and Osiris databases. 
The sample of divestitures is constrained 
within 2002–2005. This is to limit the total 
study period including [–3yr; –1yr] and [+1yr; 
+3yr] to 1999–2008, a period of stable econom-
ic growth in Malaysia. We selected this time-
frame because economic cycles could affect the 
volume and price level of asset divestitures. 
For example, Ting (2006) ascertained differing 
wealth effect for divestitures under buoyant 
and recession economic conditions in Malaysia. 
More companies were found to divest in reces-
sions (Alexandrou and Sudarsanam, 2001) as 
the profitability of companies are negatively 
impacted by tight fiscal and monetary policies. 
Yang (2008) found that asset prices peaked 
during recovery and will bottom out when the 
economy slides into recession. 
We applied a few exclusions on the study 
sample. Firstly, only divestitures of 5% per-
centage ratio and above must be publicly an-
nounced (as mentioned in section 2.2). This 
means companies divesting below this ratio 
may choose to announce on voluntary basis. 
Such divestitures are excluded to avoid bias 
sampling. Second, related party divestitures 
(e.g. between an unlisted subsidiary and its 
parent company) are excluded because the 
effects of divestiture and acquisition in each 
transaction are hard to disentangle. Next, di-
vesting companies from the financial sector 
are removed due to differing financial charac-
teristics and use of leverage (Pandey, 2001). 
Only divestitures in exchange for cash are 
included (those involving equity exchange are 
removed). Finally, for companies conducting 
multiple divestitures, only the first announced 
divestiture (at least 5% percentage ratio) will 
be taken into account as in Kaiser and Stou-
raitis (1995). 
3.2. Variables measures
The performance measure adopted is ROA, as 
it is the most informative measure of operat-
ing performance for asset divestitures (Denis 
and Shome, 2005). Each divesting company’s 
performance is industry-adjusted against the 
relevant sectors determined by BM. Studies 
such as Haynes et al. (2002) argue that ac-
counting-based measures may be manipulated 
Table 1. Independent variables measures
Independent variable Measure
Financial constraint (FINCON) Dummy variable (1 = constrained)
EBITDA < 80% of interest expense on debt
Relative size of divested asset (RELSIZE) Percentage ratio calculation
Use of Proceeds (companies can select more 
than 1 category)
2 Dummy variables (1 = yes)
Pay debt (PAYDEBT); Retain (RETAIN)
Asset efficiency (EFF) Fixed asset turnover [Sales/Total assets]
Focus (FOCUS) Sales-based Herfindahl index
[H = ΣSi2 /(ΣSi)2] where the sum of squares in each segment i’s 
sales, Si, as a proportion of total sales of the company
Results in a figure between 0–1. The closer to 1, the greater 
the focus
Company size (COSIZE) Control variable
Log (total assets)
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in the year of divestiture to result in spurious 
performance of divesting companies. In order 
to accurately reflect the actual impact of dives-
titures on company performance, the authors 
suggested a longer timeframe beyond the di-
vestiture year. 
Each company’s post-divestiture [+1yr; +3yr] 
performance is compared to its pre-divestiture 
[–1yr; –3yr] performance. To minimize random 
fluctuations in returns, pre- and post-divesti-
ture returns are averaged as in Liao (2005). 
Companies that experience improved perfor-
mance is classified as ‘success’ whereas those 
with deteriorated performance as ‘failure’. 
The independent variables are financial 
constraint, relative size of divested asset, use 
of proceeds, level of efficiency and focus. The 
measures are summarized in Table 1.
For financial constraint, we use ‘interest 
expense on debt’ rather than ‘current debt 
due’ since companies are obliged to at least 
service interest payments on its outstanding 
debt without risking default. The 80% thresh-
old is used because Asquith et al. (1994) found 
that companies would only react when their 
EBITDA falls below this level. 
3.3. Estimation method
Logistic regression is used to contrast ‘success’ 
and ‘failure’ companies based on independent 
variables in (i) pre-divestitures (ii) divestiture 
year (iii) post-divestiture periods respectively. 
The empirical model:
Yi = eu / [1 + eu]. (1)
The dependent variable = 1, event (success).
For pre-divestiture, u = (a + β1[FINCON] + 
β2[EFF] + β3[FOCUS] + b4[COSIZE]). 
For divestiture and post-divestiture, u = 
(a + β1[FINCON] + β2[PAYDT] + β3[RET] 
+ b4[EFF] + b5[FOCUS] + b6[RELSIZE] + 
b7[COSIZE]). 
Use of divestiture proceeds (PAYDT and 
RET) and relative size of divested asset 
(RELSIZE) is only known at year of divesti-
ture, hence not included in the pre-divestiture 
regression.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION
As logistic regressions are susceptible to mul-
ticollinearity, we determine zero-order corre-
lation coefficients amongst the independent 
variables (results not shown). No variables are 
significantly correlated (above 0.80) so there 
is no significant multicollinearity according to 
Gujerati (2003). 
4.1. Sample descriptive statistics
A total of 395 asset divestitures were an-
nounced within 2002–2005. From this, 67 
divestitures fall below 5% percentage ratio, 4 
divestitures from financial companies and 37 
divestitures from companies with inadequate 
information. After taking into account the first 
significant divestiture from each company (at 
least 5% percentage ratio), there were 132 sub-
sequent divestitures from these companies. All 
these are excluded and the final sample con-
sists of 155 companies where approximately 
59% of divesting companies are ‘failure’ to 
improve post-divestiture performance (91 com-
panies) and only 64 companies are ‘success’. 
Table 2 summarizes the sample’s descriptive 
statistics.
The relationship between ROA and inde-
pendent variables in pre- and post-divestiture 
periods are shown in Table 3. To take into ac-
count the longitudinal timeframe of the sam-
ple, Generalized Least Squares regressions are 
used in a panel data. 
ROA is significantly associated with nega-
tive financial constraint in both pre- and post-
divestiture periods. This means divesting com-
panies should pay greater attention to allevi-
ate financial constraint for higher likelihood 
of improved post-divestiture performance. Ef-
ficiency is positively related to ROA but signifi-
cant in pre-divestiture period only, indicating 
partial support for the wealth-maximization 
hypothesis. Larger companies are significant 
and positively associated with ROA in pre-
divestiture only. To remove this effect of com-
pany size, it is included as a control variable 
in the empirical model. 
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Failure $999.86 (avg) $971.82 (avg) –0.030
 $358.82 (med) $356.75 (med) 0.490
Success $1130.59 (avg) $1286.27 (avg) 0.891
 $313.58 (med) $321.42 (med) 0.750




Failure  22.91% ($40.41mil) avg  
  14.84% ($10.30mil) med  
Success  41.34% ($82.84mil) avg  
  19.19% ($10.69mil) med  
Efficiency (total 
asset turnover)
Failure 0.555 (avg) 0.558 (avg) 0.319
 0.418 (med) 0.418 (med) 0.127
Success 0.574 (avg) 0.673 (avg) 0.036




Failure 0.683 (avg) 0.658 (avg) –0.498
 0.669 (med) 0.635 (med) –0.202
Success 0.695 (avg) 0.672 (avg) –0.713
 0.673 (med) 0.661 (med) –0.828
Table 3. Estimates of GLS regressions with ROA as dependent variable
Independent Pre-divestiture [–3yr; –1yr] Post-divestiture [+1yr; +3yr]
variable coeff. coeff.
C –0.188 ** –0.027  
FINCON –0.161 *** –0.057 ***
RELSIZE  0.001  
EFF 0.028 ** 0.016  
FOCUS 0.027 0.04  
PAYDEBT  –0.008  
RETAIN  –0.012  
COSIZE 0.036 *** 0.000  
where: [–3yr;–1yr] denotes annualized average values for pre-divestiture years 1–3. [+1yr;+3yr] 
denotes annualized average values for post-divestiture years 1–3.
4.2. Company attributes associated with 
improved post-divestiture performance
The results of the empirical model are shown 
in Table 4. Significant variables are financial 
constraint, relative size of divested asset and 
retention of proceeds. 
4.2.1. Improved performance associated 
with reduced financial constraint
‘Success’ companies have significantly higher 
financial constraint in pre-divestiture period, 
which is then significantly lowered in post-
divestiture. This indicates ‘success’ companies 
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Table 4. Summary of logistic regressions
Independent 
variables
Pre-divestiture [–3yr; –1yr] Divestiture year [Yr 0] Post-divestiture [+1yr; +3yr]
coeff. coeff. coeff.
C –3.454  –2.448  –2.108  
FINCON 1.293 *** 0.192  –1.431 ***
RELSIZE  1.623 ** 2.055 ***
EFF 0.285  0.408  0.112  
FOCUS 0.119  0.139  0.404  
PAYDT  0.284  0.543  
RETAIN  –0.592  –0.712 *
COSIZE 0.443 0.268  0.253  
Successful companies = event, 1; Failure companies = non-event, 0.
‘Financial constraint’ is indicated by dummy variable, where: 1 = constrained, 0 = otherwise. ‘Pay debt’ is a 
dummy variable, where: 1 = pay debt, 0 = otherwise. Ditto for ‘retain proceeds’. 
are more likely to divest to alleviate financial 
constraint. Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
Figure 2 illustrates that more than 35% 
of ‘success’ companies were financially con-
strained in pre-divestiture and divestiture 
years. In post-divestiture years 2 and 3, finan-
cial constraint is significantly reduced to less 
than 20% and 15% respectively. The results 
for ‘success’ companies indicate support for 
Lang et al. (1995) where managers divest only 
when compelled to due to debt service. When 
the company faces default risk that threatens 
managers’ employment, their interests will be 
aligned with the shareholders’. Managers will 
act on shareholders’ best interest by focusing 
on minimizing financial constraint. 
Figure 2. Companies with financial constraint



















On the other hand, ‘failure’ companies had 
lower financial constraint in pre-divestiture 
years but higher in post-divestiture. The ex-
planation by Bates (2005) describes ‘failure’ 
companies where managers voluntarily divest 
without financial constraint. They converted 
illiquid assets to cash to be utilized at their 
discretion. ‘Failure’ companies prefer raising 
funds through private transactions such as as-
set divestitures as capital market monitoring 
can be avoided. Furthermore, ‘failure’ compa-
nies subsequently experience post-divestiture 
financial constraint, suggesting that divesti-
ture proceeds had later become unavailable. 
This demonstrates possible investments in 
suboptimal projects by ‘failure’ companies, 
since they experienced lower post-divestiture 
ROA. The results support the assertion by 
Easterbrook (1984) where managers invest in 
relatively safe projects with suboptimal yield 
to preserve their personal interests at share-
holders’ expense. 
4.2.2. Improved performance associated 
with larger relative size of divested 
assets 
Relative size of divested asset is significant 
and positively associated with ‘success’ compa-
nies in divestiture and post-divestiture years. 
Specifically, Table 2 shows that ‘success’ com-
panies divested approximately 41% percentage 
ratio (around RM82million) as compared to 
23% (about RM40mil) for ‘failure’ companies. 
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Hence, hypothesis 2 is supported. The discrep-
ancy between monetary value and percentage 
ratio is because ‘success’ companies are larger 
than ‘failure’ companies. However, the differ-
ence in company size is not statistically sig-
nificant.
‘Success’ companies were compelled to di-
vest large assets defensively even though this 
places them under greater scrutiny. The re-
sults support earlier findings on hypothesis 1 
where more than 1/3 of ‘success’ companies en-
dured pre-divestiture financial constraint. On 
the other hand, ‘failure’ companies divested 
slightly lower than the 25% percentage ratio. 
By maintaining the relative size of divested 
asset below this threshold, ‘failure’ companies 
manage to avoid mandatory shareholder ap-
proval to divest assets. These findings indicate 
support for the agency theory where larger as-
sets are divested under duress. Combined with 
the results in hypothesis 1, companies with 
prior urgent and compelling motive to divest 
large assets tend to perform better in enhanc-
ing shareholder wealth. Companies without 
such prior motives divest smaller assets in or-
der to avoid intense scrutiny for self-serving 
interests. 
4.2.3. Improved performance associated 
with proceeds used to pay debt
‘Success’ companies have significantly negative 
propensity to retain divestiture proceeds but 
higher (not statistically significant) tendency 
to pay debt. The results indicate that ‘failure’ 
companies are more likely to retain proceeds 
and less likely to pay debt. Hypothesis 3 is 
supported. 
Relating the results to hypothesis 1, ‘suc-
cess’ companies mainly used divestiture pro-
ceeds to pay debt as they urgently needed to 
reduce financial constraint. ‘Failure’ compa-
nies do not face high pre-divestiture financial 
constraint, so they have a tendency to retain 
proceeds instead. 
The findings support Jensen (1986) where 
proceeds retained at managers’ discretion 
causes agency problems that are detrimental 
to company performance. Furthermore, none of 
the divesting companies rewarded sharehold-
ers using the divestiture proceeds so Claessens 
et al. (1999) may be correct to state that divi-
dends are withheld at minority shareholders’ 
expense. It could also indicate that Malaysian 
companies do not practice rewarding share-
holders with divestiture proceeds.
4.2.4. Improved performance related to 
higher efficiency and reduction in focus
Efficiency is positively related to ‘success’ in 
asset divestitures but the relationship is not 
statistically significant. This is probably be-
cause ‘success’ companies were more efficient 
than ‘failure’ companies in both pre- and post-
divestiture periods, as shown in Table 2. How-
ever, the improvement in efficiency is signifi-
cant for ‘success’ companies, with an increase 
in average total asset turnover ratio of 0.10 
(from 0.574 in pre-divestiture to 0.673 in post-
divestiture) whereas ‘failure’ companies expe-
rienced insignificant improvement (from 0.555 
to 0.558). Hence, hypothesis 4 is only partially 
supported.
The results show ‘success’ companies paid 
greater attention in selecting inefficient assets 
to divest than ‘failure’ companies. Markides 
and Singh (1997) determined that divesti-
tures of inefficient assets are viewed as ef-
fort to remedying prior managerial excesses. 
The efficiency of the remaining assets in the 
company improves, leading to enhanced share-
holder wealth. 
Focus is also not a significant variable as-
sociated with ‘success’ companies in asset di-
vestitures. Similar to efficiency, this could be 
attributed to ‘success’ companies being consist-
ently more focused that ‘failure’ companies in 
both pre- and post-divestiture years. However, 
both subsamples experienced reduction in fo-
cus from pre- to post-divestiture. According to 
Table 2, ‘success’ companies experienced aver-
age reduction in Herfindahl index from 0.695 
to 0.672. ‘Failure’ companies also reduced fo-
cus from 0.683 to 0.658 – a magnitude equiva-
lent to ‘success’ companies. Hence, hypothesis 
5 is not supported.
This means the average company in the 
sample became more diversified by divesting 
assets that were related to its core business, 
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although the change in focus is not statistically 
significant. Hence, the results denote support 
for studies such as Fauver et al. (2003) and 
Khanna and Palepu (1997) that diversification 
is beneficial for companies in developing coun-
tries. The benefits of increased diversification 
such as creation of internal capital markets to 
compensate for lower external financing sourc-
es seem to outweigh its disadvantages in this 
context. The results contradict studies that 
document greater potential expropriation of 
minority shareholders (such as Lins and Ser-
vaes, 2002) and value loss from diversification 
discount (Berger and Ofek, 1995; John and 
Ofek, 1995) that leads to lower shareholder 
wealth.
5. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The wealth-maximization hypothesis proposed 
that managers divest assets in order to im-
prove company performance and ultimately 
shareholder wealth. However, studies tend to 
concur with agency theory instead and suggest 
that managers value growth maximization and 
will divest only when compelled to, e.g. the ur-
gent need for internal funds because external 
sources are scarce or expensive (Lang et al., 
1995). 
Using a sample from an emerging country, 
Malaysia, the results of this study show strong 
influence of agency problems in asset divesti-
tures of public-listed companies. We found 
large assets are predominantly divested by fi-
nancially constrained companies that are com-
pelled to divest in order to repay debt. These 
companies seem to improve post-divestiture 
performance. On the contrary, ‘failure’ divest-
ing companies without the pressure of finan-
cial constraint tend to divest smaller assets 
to minimize external scrutiny and retain pro-
ceeds. These ‘failure’ companies subsequently 
face post-divestiture financial constraint, and 
as performance deteriorated, indicating that 
divestiture proceeds are already invested in 
suboptimal projects. 
None of the divesting companies rewarded 
shareholders using divestiture proceeds. This 
may be a manifestation of the agency prob-
lem as predicted by Claessens et al. (1999), 
or because it is not normal practice for Ma-
laysian companies. As shown by the positive 
association between efficiency and ‘success’ 
companies, selection of assets that are more 
inefficient increases the likelihood of improved 
post-divestiture performance. 
The average divesting company in Malaysia 
will select assets from their core businesses to 
divest rather than peripheral businesses. Con-
trary to studies in developed countries which 
promote increasing company focus, divesting 
companies in Malaysia view that reducing fo-
cus (increasing diversification) will lead to im-
proved performance. This is plausibly due to 
the benefits of diversified companies such as 
creation of internal capital markets that are 
more valuable to a developing country. 
The implication of these results to inves-
tors is that for companies to ‘succeed’ in asset 
divestitures amidst the agency problems, com-
panies must face urgent need to raise funds 
where divestiture proceeds are paid out and 
not retained. Investors should be wary of com-
panies that divest without compelling purpos-
es. Investors should also view divestitures of 
assets from the core businesses in a positive 
light as such divestitures may not necessar-
ily hamper future company performance. For 
regulatory authorities, they may wish to pay 
greater attention to the subsequent actions of 
companies that retain proceeds. 
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